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Voter, Citizen, Enemy
Kanika Gauba, Anshuman Singh
The ruling party’s attempts to 
redefi ne citizenship seem intent 
on bringing popular notions 
of Indianness in line with its 
cultural sympathies, in time for 
the general elections in 2019. In a 
post-truth age of alternate facts, it 
may be trite to point out that the 
state can change entire narratives 
by controlling defi nitions. This 
article examines the Citizenship 
Bill, 2016 and the Enemy Property 
(Amendment and Validation) Act, 
2017 to fi nd out if the erasure of 
the Muslim as “voter” dovetails 
with a radical refashioning of an 
“enemy” who is also a “citizen.”
The Bharatiya Janta Party’s (BJP) success in the recent assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP) has 
made its campaign strategies the subject 
of several dissections. One of its political 
strategies was to refrain altogether from 
appealing to the Muslim electorate, which 
has historically been important to political 
fortunes in the state. Arguably, such a 
strategy of marginalising the community 
undermines the Muslim citizen’s status 
as a voter with a signifi cant stake in our 
demo cracy. Indeed, the party’s thumping 
majority has some convinced that Muslims 
can no longer rely on traditional electoral 
politics to protect their interests.1 Perhaps 
more worryingly, we note how the govern-
ment’s recent legislative excursions seem 
to align with, but also ideologically require/
reinforce, such an electoral strategy. Read-
ing together the Citizenship Bill, 2016 and 
the Enemy Property (Amendment and 
Validation) Act, 2017, we examine whether 
the erasure of the Muslim as “voter” 
dovetails with the radical refashioning 
of an “enemy” that is also a “citizen.”
Natural Migrants, 
Unnatural Citizens
Written amidst the carnage and chaos 
of partition, the Constitution of 1950 
empowered future Parliaments to decide 
the specifi c conditions of citizenship. The 
Citizenship Act, 1955 provides four routes 
to becoming Indian: birth, des cent, regis-
tration or naturalisation. The latter two 
are closed to those without valid passport 
or permission to stay or those who over-
stayed the authorised period, defi  ned 
as “illegal migrants.” The Citizenship 
(Amendment) Bill, 2016 (henceforth, 
Citizenship Bill) hopes to change this 
defi nition by excluding “persons belonging 
to minority communities, namely, Hindus, 
Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Chris-
tians from Afgh anistan, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan.” A September 2015 notifi cation 
by the Ministry of Home Aff airs paved 
the way for implementation, pre-empting 
formal discussion on the bill.2
The Citizenship Bill laments the diffi -
culties faced by persons of these commu-
nities—in proving Indian origin, long 
years required to establish naturalisation, 
and denial of opportunities enjoyed by 
Indian citizens “even though they are 
likely to stay permanently.” (The notifi -
cation issued by the ministry refers to 
these communities as facing religious 
persecution or threat thereof.) It does 
not explain important omissions in its 
list—Baha’is, Ahmadis, Sufi s, Shias, athe-
ists, etc—minorities that face religious 
persecution in the enlisted countries, or 
indeed Tamils from Sri Lanka. It also 
does not explain the empirical or 
normative bases on which Hindus, Sikhs, 
Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians 
are “more likely to stay permanently” in 
 India than other religious groups. If the 
real reason behind the Citizenship Bill is 
to protect religious minorities in the 
 immediate South Asian neighbourhood, 
it is laudable for recognising the close 
cultural threads that weave persons 
 living in the region together. However, 
excluding certain religious communi-
ties, especially on a myopic conception 
of a homogeneous Muslim community 
(sans persecuted minorities), is cont r ary 
to constitutional commitments to equal-
ity, fraternity and secularism. It must be 
noted that the protection of equality—
equality before law and equal protection 
of the law—under Article 14 of the Con-
stitution extends to all persons in India, 
not just citizens. The mere fact that cer-
tain groups of persons are less likely or 
improbable to avail of an option does not 
make it constitutionally permissible to 
deny them equal protection from reli-
gious persecution.
Oddly, the government of Assam is 
pledged to the contrary battle before the 
Supreme Court, that is, expelling illegal 
Bangladeshi migrants from the state. 
Calls from ethnic groups like the Asom 
Gana Parishad that condemn grant of 
citizenship to all illegal migrants irre-
spective of their religion, sound reason-
able in present circumstances. The centre’s 
enthusiasm to treat certain migrant 
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communities as prodigal sons and dau-
ghters is thus diffi cult to understand. In 
any case, the signal the bill sends is clear—
Muslims outside the country, even if per-
secuted, do not belong in India. 
Perpetual Enmity
While the Citizenship Bill repels the 
 enemy outside the nation, the amended 
law on enemy property turns to the ene-
my within. The law originates from the 
colonial era Defence of India Rules, 1939, 
adopted by the postcolonial state during 
the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars. These rules 
aimed to attack commercial interests of 
an aggressor state (“enemy”) in order to 
prevent it from profi ting through trade 
or business within the home country. 
One method of doing so included seizing 
enemy property and vesting it in an 
offi cial called the Custodian. Once these 
emergency laws lapsed, the Enemy Prop-
erty Act (henceforth, EP Act) was passed 
in 1968 to prolong the Custodian’s hold 
over declared enemy property.
It is vital to note that both the EP Act 
and the Defence of India laws do 
not  include Indian citizens in the defi ni-
tion of “enemy” or “enemy subject.” 
They do not suggest that a person or 
organisation should be considered a 
perpetual enemy of India. Moreover, the 
Custodian’s role appears to have been 
managerial; for instance, Section 8 of 
the EP Act empowers him to maintain 
the enemy and his dependents out of the 
property or make payments to them. 
However, Indian authorities were loath 
to return confi scated properties, especially 
as Pakistan had immediately liquidated 
Indian-held properties.
The raja of Mahmudabad, with a vast 
inheritance spread over Uttar Pradesh 
and Uttarakhand, is one of the fi gures 
worst hit by the law on enemy property. 
Although his father had migrated to 
 Pakistan in 1957, he and his mother 
 remained Indian citizens. On the death 
of his father in 1973, the raja sought 
 return of the properties arguing that he 
could inherit the properties as an Indian 
heir. At the end of a protracted battle, 
the Supreme Court settled the issue in 
2005.3 A citizen could never be an enemy 
under the EP Act, it held. Further, it 
found that custodianship was managerial 
in nature and did not confer absolute 
ownership of enemy property in the 
 Custodian. It directed the government to 
release the raja’s properties.
In 2010, the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) government unsuccessfully tried 
to reverse the judgment through an ordi-
nance, converted into a bill, for continued 
vesting in the Custodian. Crucially, it did 
not change the defi nition of an  enemy to 
include Indians. A second bill was intro-
duced in Parliament to return confi scated 
properties to owners (provided they 
were citizens by birth) and restrict liti-
gation, which lapsed.
The Enemy Property (Amendment and 
Validation) Ordinance (henceforth, EP 
Amendment) was fi rst promulgated by 
the President in January 2016; within 
the short span of a year, it would be re-
promulgated four more times. The cor-
responding bill was passed by the Lok 
Sabha a day after its introduction and 
was passed by the Rajya Sabha on 
10 March 2017 through a voice vote 
amidst walkout by the opposition. It 
 received the assent of the President on 
14 March 2017 and was notifi ed to the 
public the same day. The Statement of 
Object and Reasons provides the follow-
ing purpose for its existence:
Of late, there have been various judgments 
by various courts that have adversely aff e cted 
the powers of the Custodian and the Govern-
ment of India as provided under the Enemy 
Property Act, 1968. In view of such inter-
pretation by various courts, the Custodian 
is fi nding it diffi cult to sustain his actions 
 under the Enemy Property Act, 1968.4
However, the EP Amendment signifi -
cantly alters the original position. Since 
it makes these changes retrospective, 
the law has to be read as if it always 
stood this way. To put it simply, the EP 
Amendment creates two legal fi ctions 
and then deems them to have always 
been true: (i) citizen–heir as “enemy,” and 
(ii) Custodian as absolute owner. First, 
the defi nition of “enemy” now  includes 
Indian heirs and successors of so-called 
enemies, notwithstanding their citizen-
ship. Next, the EP Amendment says that 
the new enemies (who are Indians) do 
not have, and never had, any right to 
inherit or transfer their property. Any 
transfer made by such persons after 1968 
is void in the eyes of the law. Contrary to 
the EP Act and 2005 judgment, it installs 
absolute rights over the confi scated 
pro perty in the Custodian in order to 
dispose of the property, the proceeds go-
ing to the Consolidated Fund of India. 
Arguably, the EP Amendment changes the 
purpose of the parent act—from preserv-
ing the enemy property to selling it. 
The political rhetoric accompanying 
the amendment speaks of “natural jus-
tice” and “plugging legal loopholes” in 
the parent act. It repeated ad nauseam the 
`1 lakh crore valuation of enemy property 
to a demonetisation-struck public. The 
raja of Mahmudabad, with his large 
wealth and troubled history becomes a 
convenient elite against which to pit the 
public, but what of the EP Amendment’s 
impact on non-elite enemies? One cannot 
deny that the actual effect of the amend-
ment is to denude countless Indian citi-
zens of their lawful ownership of property 
sans compensation, to enrich the treasury.
One would hope that fi ve decades of 
general peace would be enough time for 
both sides to reconsider the decision to 
use a label like “enemy.” Far from it, the 
changes incorporated by the EP Amend-
ment fashion a new category of legal per-
sons—“citizen–enemies.” Much like the 
colloquial “frenemy,” it may be collapsed 
into the portmanteau “cinemy” to imply 
one who appears to be a citizen but is, in 
fact (and now in law), dealt with as an 
 enemy. How will the new defi nition 
vis-à-vis  enemy property law impact a 
cinemy’s enjoyment of other legal, consti-
tutional and fundamental rights? Is she 
exempt from performances of nationalism 
and other fundamental duties, such as 
standing up for the national anthem in 
theatres? The EP Amendment does not 
clarify. Nor does it pause to consider how 
the connotation of “enemy” will affect 
the everyday lives of these citizens.
In any case, the EP Amendment will 
likely run into constitutional roadblocks. 
Citizens, except when historically disad-
vantaged, are equal in terms of Article 14. 
Here, the amendment categorises citizens 
into two classes, those who are heirs/
successors to enemies and those who are 
not, depriving the former of crucial rights 
to property and succession. It also affects 
third-party owners’ settled rights over 
property bought from Indian enemies. 
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Fifty years after the wars, in the absence 
of a declaration to the effect by the 
government, it would be diffi cult to 
argue that divesting citizens and bona 
fi de third parties from their property 
and branding them “enemies” serve to 
attack the commercial interests of China 
or Pakistan, or plug any loopholes in the 
parent act. Instead, the government’s 
actions under the amended law are likely 
to appear arbitrary, not least because of 
the law’s retrospectivity.
Moreover, with the Ministry of Home 
Affairs pegging the number of immove-
able properties belonging to Pakistani 
nationals at 9,280, compared with a 
paltry 149 properties belonging to Chinese 
nationals, it becomes diffi cult to ignore 
the communal nature of the classifi cation, 
that is, the religious identity of the citi-
zens it will most impact.5 The expanded 
defi nition of enemy certainly impacts the 
Muslim community more than others, and 
perhaps this amounts to religion-based 
discrimination, against which Article 15 
protects all citizens. We add the usual 
disclaimer here—the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on equa lity is whimsical, to 
say the least. However, one hopes that the 
fate of the British custodianship  system, 
which was wound up in 1988, would factor 
in the Court’s decision, as it was with a 
similarly obsolete colonial law in John 
Vallamattom v Union of  India (2003).6
Changing Narratives
Perhaps the binary between citizen and 
enemy was long obfuscated and what we 
are witnessing today is the legal hollowing 
out of the notion of the “enemy.” Arguably, 
the parent act belonged to an older 
paradigm that understood the enemy as 
belonging to a warring nation. With the 
“nation” as frame, it therefore maintained 
a clear conceptual binary between 
“enemy” and “citizen.” One could situate 
the discomfort of the court in the 2005 
case through this register. But the EP 
Amendment radically departs from such a 
paradigm. By making possible an enemy 
who is also a citizen, it obfuscates both 
poles by decoupling them. Binaries of 
citizen/enemy collapse into new concep-
tions such as “cinemy.” The choicest 
insults of our age—“porkistani,” “porki,” 
“pseudo-sickular,” “anti-national,” etc—
certainly suggest a conceptual change in 
public imagination.
But once such conceptions migrate 
from social media to the statute book, it 
becomes troubling indeed. As Bourdieu 
hints, such a “power to name” and to 
create by naming is perhaps the very 
 essence of legal power. 
Law is the quintessential form of the sym-
bolic power of naming that creates the 
things named, and creates social groups in 
particular. It confers upon the reality which 
arises from its classifi catory operations the 
maximum permanence that any social entity 
has the power to confer upon another, the 
permanence which we attribute to objects. 
The law is the quintessential form of ‘active’ 
discourse, able by its own operation to pro-
duce its effects. It would not be excessive to 
say that it creates the social world, but only if 
we remember that it is this world which fi rst 
creates the law.7
The ruling party’s attempts to redefi ne 
citizenship seem intent on bringing pop-
ular notions of Indianness in line with its 
cultural sympathies, in time for the gen-
eral elections in 2019. In a post-truth age of 
alternate facts, it may be trite to point out 
that the state can change  entire narratives 
by controlling defi nitions. As citizens, we 
must certainly  respect the large mandate 
and growing national presence of the 
BJP, but must also take note when the 
state uses its monopoly over law-making 
to change  legal defi nitions restrictively, 
retrospectively. Thus, when coupled with 
the degradation of the Muslim vote in 
UP, the seemingly innocuous changes to 
the meanings of “illegal migrant” and 
“enemy” portend diffi cult, if not uncon-
stitutional, times ahead for the country.
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EPWRF India Time Series
Expansion of Banking Statistics Module
 Banking Indicators for 653 Districts 
District-wise data has been added to the Banking Statistics module of the EPWRF India Time 
Series (ITS) database. 
This sub-module provides data for 653 districts for the following variables:
● Deposit—No. of Accounts and Amount, by Population Group (rural, semi-urban, 
urban and metropolitan)
● Credit (as per Sanction)—Amount Outstanding, by Population Group
● Credit (as per Utilisation)—No. of Accounts and Amount Outstanding, by sectors 
● Credit-Deposit (CD) Ratio 
● Number of Bank Offi ces—By Population Group
The data series are available from December 1972; on a half-yearly basis till June 1989 and 
on an annual basis thereafter. These data have been sourced from Reserve Bank of India’s 
publication, Basic Statistical Returns (BSR) of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India.
This module is a comprehensive database on the progress of commercial banking in India in 
terms of extending the geographical spread and functional reach.  
The EPWRF ITS has 16 modules covering a range of macroeconomic, fi nancial and social 
sector indicators on the Indian economy.
For more details, visit www.epwrfi ts.in or e-mail to: its@epwrf.in
